)>IJH=?J This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic volatility. In a cross section of countries, we show that higher trust is associated with lower macroeconomic instability. We use the inherited trust of Americans as an instrumental variable of trust in their origin country to overcome all potential reverse causality concerns. We use changes in inherited trust over the XXth century to show that increasing trust also decreases volatility across time. Thus, trust is shown to be an important determinant of macroeconomic stability both in space and time. Finally, we show that trust reduces investment volatility but not public expenditure volatility.
Introduction
The cost of real macroeconomic volatility in terms of well-being as been shown by Wolfers (2003) to be quantitatively important. Thus, all the factors that are able to foster or weaken it deserve attention. This paper investigates the relationship between trust and macroeconomic instability. In a cross section of countries, higher trust is correlated with weaker macroeconomic volatility. We focus on this relationship and test alternative determinants of macroeconomic stability. However, macroeconomic stability remains an unexplored economic outcome that may be in part explained by trust as suggested by the relationship we mentioned.
Trust is an indicator of social capital. This later concept has been dened by Putman (2000) as the collective values of all social networks and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each others.
Thus, trust represents a set of beliefs that favor inter-personal cooperation within the society. Trust may thus favor economic performance.
Trust may favor macroeconomic stability through two channels. First, since trust implies extended civic behavior, it may be associated with better economic management by the authorities if it reects a greater cohesion of the society. Indeed, it has been shown by Knack and Keefer (1997) that countries with higher trust have also better institutions. According to Acemoglu et al. (2003) , countries with better institutions exhibit lower macroeconomic volatility. Hence, if trust deters the discretionary use of public expenditures it can thus implies weaker macroeconomic volatility due to less volatile policies.
Second, following Glaeser et al. (2000) , trust, the most general dimension of social capital, is closely linked to trustworthiness.
1 Hence, individual trust can be considered as empathy or as an individual commitment to behave well with other agents. This decreases costs of interactions and allows to build expectations and plans with greater certainty. In line with this reasoning, Knack and Keefer (1997) documented a positive relationship between trust and the share of investment in GDP. But if trust makes investment higher, it should also make it more stable over time, what is also likely to smooth aggregate output. Although explaining the deep mechanisms of these two channels at the individual level is beyond the scope of this paper, these two explanations are tested in the last section,where we show that trust is higly negatively correlated with the volatility of investment but not with the one This assertion has been discussed by Fehr et al. (2003) and Sapienza et al. (2007) . of public expenditure.
These channels from trust, and social capital in general, to macroeconomic stability can be found under alternative and various forms in the literature that investigates the impact of culture and social capital on economic outcomes. In that dimension, this paper is closely related to all researches that aim to point a link from social capital to economic outcomes.
After the funding pieces of work run by Putman (1993), lots of evidence about the impact of social capital on economic performance have been raised by scholars. Knack and Keefer (1997) showed that countries with higher social capital have also better institutions, higher and more equal incomes, and a better educated population. Similar evidence have been provided by Tabellini (2005) A key aspect of this literature is about the issue of the malleability of beliefs with respect to current economic situation. In rough terms, a rst approach considers that norms and values of a society are very sticky and slow moving parameters and therefore weakly altered by current events ; on the contrary, a second approach emphasizes the changes in beliefs induced by changes in the current economic situation. Our view is closer to the former approach. In this paper, we assume that trust is a latent component of a society. Consequently, we consider that latent culture is unaected by macroeconomic volatility. Our rst set of results do rely on this assumption. Indeed, we rst measure trust trough the widely used question of the World Values Survey, using the share of trusting people as a proxy for generalized trust at the country level during the last quarter of the 20th century.
However, the hypothesis that current measure of trust may be impacted by current macroeconomic outcomes cannot be fully rejected. For example, it has been shown by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) that people who experienced recessions during early adulthood are likely to have lower individual social capital. Hence, we need a measure of trust at the country level that is unaltered by macroeconomic instability. Subsequently, we conrm earlier results by using inherited trust of Americans as an instrument for the latent trust in their origin country. This method, inspired by Carroll et al. (1994) and used by Fernandez and Fogli (2009) among others, overcome all potential reverse causality eects. As a result, we will conclude that trust decreases macroeconomic volatility in space.
However, the later results do not mean that higher trust is associated with higher economic stability at the country level. In order to investigate this question, we need a time-varying measure of trust. Such a measure does In all our estimations, trust is proved to be an important determinant of macroeconomic stability. However, it is not the only one. A rich literature has examined the key determinants of macroeconomic volatility. Most of theses papers focus on the institutional and political context. Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that stabilizations are delayed because interest groups ght to know who will bear the economic burden. In the same vain, Rodrik (1999) shows that the greater the latent social conicts in a society and the weaker its institutions of conict management, the larger are the eects of external shocks on growth. In the case of less developed countries, Acemoglu et al. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data we used and the estimation strategy. Section 3 presents simple cross section estimates. Section 4 use inherited trust as an instrument for trust in cross section and panel estimations, this allow to overcome backward causality between economic uctuations and trust and to asses the within eect of trust on macroeconomic volatility. Section 5 distinguishes between the volatility of the dierent components of GDP. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Data and estimation strategy
This section documents our estimation strategies and describes the various data used in this analysis.
Cross-country regressions To investigate the eect of trust on macroeconomic instability in space, we estimate following cross country model using ordinary least squares :
where V olatility i is an indicator of macroeconomic instability in country i and T rust i is the measure of trust in country i for the period of interest. x ji is a control variable which may explain cross section dierences in macroeconomic volatility, ε i is the error term. Some specications also include regional dummies for Africa, Latin America, Central America, Asia and Middle East to control for common economic patterns. If trust has a negative impact on macroeconomic volatility across countries, then the coecient of trust, i.e. a 1 , will be negative and signicant.
Panel regressions To investigate the eect of trust on macroeconomic stability across time, we estimate following panel data model using ordinary least squares :
where the notations are as above, except that subscript it denotes country i at time t. Equation (2) also includes country xed eects denoted by I i . Consequently, the estimation of this model gives information about the within eect of trust on economic volatility. If trust has a negative impact on macroeconomic volatility across time at the country level, then the coecient of trust, i.e. a 1 , will be negative and signicant. T rust
where T rust 
Cross section estimates
This section documents the empirical relationship between trust and macroeconomic volatility in space. We present results of standard OLS estimations.
To investigate the eect of trust on macroeconomic stability, we rst estimate equation (1) East. This leaves unchanged the value of the coecient related to trust.
In column 9, we present the results of the most demanding specication, i.e. including all the above mentioned control variables. According to these # In this sample, the standard deviation of the trust variable equals 0.16, which means that a one standard deviation increase in trust is comparable to an increase of 16 percentage points in the share of trusting people.
$ Terms of trade data are missing for three countries : Austria, Cyprus and Finland.
results, a one standard deviation increase in trust induces a 0.52 decrease in volatility whereas comparable eects of changes in initial population equals 0.91. Thus, the results presented in table 1 show that trust still explains a major part of cross country dierences macroeconomic volatility when controlling for a large set of macroeconomic variables. Table 2 show the results when including all alternative variables together. Results remain unchanged. Column 7 presents the estimated coecient for the most demanding specication, including regional dummies. In this specication, the estimated eect of a one standard deviation in trust equals 0.65 whereas the one associated with a similar change in institutions quality equals 0.87. Hence, both eects have the same order of magnitude. Note that a 0.65 % Terms of trade changes are excluded because data are missing for Austria, Cyprus and Finland. We run the same regressions including terms of trade changes and excluding these three countries, but this does not alter the results. To sum up results presented in table 1 and 2, we note that trust is substantially associated with macroeconomic stability, measured as the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate, and that institutional quality is the strongest alternative explanatory variable. Having said that, we now focus on an alternative measure of macroeconomic instability in order to get more evidences about the eect of trust on economic stability. The corresponding eect on the frequency of negative real GDP per capita growth for a one standard deviation change equals −0.019. Evaluated at the mean, this represents a 16% drop in volatility. Note that when including However, as presented in table 9 (in appendix), the estimation of inherited trust is made from a really small number of respondent for some countries. This is especially the case for Asian countries for example (China, India, Japan and Philippines). This fact encourages to control for potential biases for these countries by introducing a dummy variable. This is what we do in the second part of table 3 (columns 6 to 10). The estimated coecients are unchanged when including a dummy variable for Asia.
Using instrumental variables allows to avoid all endogeneity concerns and to show that trust has a strong and signicant eect on the indicators of macroeconomic instability in cross country regressions. Moreover, alternative explanatory variables exhibits both weaker coecients and lower signicance when trust is instrumented by inherited trust. Estimated eects of trust on macroeconomic instability are of great magnitude. In the case of the frequency of negative growth events, we estimated that a 10 percentage points change in trust induces up to a 40% cut in the frequency of negative growth events at the mean. Using the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate as dependent variable, the same change in trust induce a 13% cut in volatility. This later results is closer to the eects estimated in simple OLS regressions with more countries, but it is much stronger than the eect estimated with OLS for the limited sample.
The results of this instrumental variable strategy oer the opportunity to state that trust is not only associated with macroeconomic stability in a cross section of countries, but also that trust decreases macroeconomic volatility.
Within estimates
We will now investigate whether the eect of trust on volatility is also valid at the country level. Here, we use changes in inherited trust of US immigrants as a proxy for trust changes in their origin country. We follow Algan and Cahuc (2010) by using dierent immigration waves to assess changes in inherited trust. Accordingly, inherited trust in year T is estimated using second generation immigrants born before T , third generation immigrants born before T + 25 and fourth generation immigrants born before T + 50.
We estimated inherited trust in 1910 and 1970 with respect to Norwegian Observed countries are following : Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.
Although this choice is ultimately arbitrary, our results are robust to changes in the denition of the periods, provided that the two necessary conditions mentioned in text are satised. 
Volatility of GDP components
In this section, we turn back to cross country regressions and investigate how the volatility of the dierent components of GDP is linked to trust. We use standard OLS regressions in order to maximize the number of observations and thus include a large number of control variables. Indeed, using instrumental variables as in section 4 would reduce the number of observations.
However, results presented in this section hold for instrumental variables.
The sample is identical to the one used in table 1. We computed the standard deviation of real per capita growth rate of investment, consumption and public expenditure. Our main interest lies in the comparison between estimated coecients of trust when using the volatility of investment or public expenditure as dependent variables. Consistently with the two channels from trust to volatility stressed in the introduction, this comparison should allow to determine the most important one. Here, consumption can be seen as a benchmark since it is a by-product of GDP.
Estimated coecients are reported in table 5. For each dependent variable, we present the simplest relationship and then control by macroeconomic variables and regional dummies. Columns 1, 4 and 7 show that the estimated coecient of trust is stronger for investment than for public expenditure or consumption. However, the signicance of the estimated coecient disappears in columns 8 and 9 when we introduce control variables, the standard deviation of public expenditure being the dependent variable. Although weaker, the estimated coecient of trust remains sizable and signicant if the dependent variable is the volatility of investment, in columns 5 and 6.
Logically, the estimated coecient of trust is close to the one found in table 1 in the case of consumption. These results suggest that the level of trust has no eect on the volatility of public expenditure but has an eect on the volatility of investment.
This suggests that trust has an eect on macroeconomic volatility through the investment channel, not through the public expenditure channel. This interpretation fosters the idea that trust acts as a social commitment which induces greater certainty in investment. This in turn invalidates the idea that governments create less economic turbulences in countries with higher trust.
Conclusion
In a cross section of countries, trust has been shown to be negatively associated with macroeconomic instability. Higher trust reduces the frequency of crisis and weakens the standard deviation of real GDP per capita growth rate.
Using trust of Americans as a latent indicator of trust in their origin country, we provided additional evidence of these eects, avoiding all potential reverse causality concerns. In particular, we showed that an increase in trust implies a decrease in the frequency of negative growth events at the country level. Finally, turning back to simple cross country regressions, we showed that trust reduces the volatility of investment, but not of public expenditure.
Our estimates suggest that trust is likely to be a key determinant in macroeconomic stability. Thus lower volatility can be added to the list of economic outcomes favored by higher trust. Dependent variable are the standard deviations of consumption, investment and public expenditure per capita real growth rate 1970-2007 Dependent variable is the frequency of negative real GDP per capita growth 1970-2007 
